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Abstract
This paper considers a model of household demand for water in a theoretical
framework consistent with funtamendal principles of comsumer behaviour. It ap-
plies this model to individual household data to estimate the price and income
elasticities of residential demand for water in Cyprus and evaluate the welfare ef-
fects associated with changes in the water pricing system. We &nd that the current
regionally heterogeneous increasing block pricing system in the island introduces
gross price distortions that are not justi&ed either on eﬃciency or equity grounds.
A shift towards uniform marginal cost pricing will eliminate the deadweight loss of
the current system. However, its bene&ts will be distributed in favour of the better
oﬀ households. Overall, price can be an eﬀective tool for residential water demand
management, however, it may also lead to socially undesirable distributional eﬀects
on households.
JEL Classi&cation:
Keywords: Residential water demand, increasing block pricing, consumer welfare,
water management.
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1 Introduction
The use of price as a water consumption management tool has been an issue of
growing concern among private and public utilities in Europe and the United States.
Water utilities often choose among three types of pricing schemes, uniform, decreas-
ing and increasing block rates (or some combination of them) to in! uence water use.
Economists have attempted to shed some light on the consequences of this choice by
paying attention to demand estimation. However, opinions concerning the appropriate
methodology for estimating water demand models diﬀer. This paper considers demand
for water in the context of a theoretical framework consistent with fundamental prin-
ciples of consumer behaviour. It then applies this model to individual household data
drawn from the Cyprus Family Expenditure Survey (1996-97) to estimate the price
and income elasticities of residential demand for water and evaluate the welfare eﬀects
associated with potential changes in the current water pricing system.
Given that consumers in Cyprus are metered, there are strong eﬃciency arguments
for prices to re! ect the (long-run) marginal social cost of water scarcity. At the moment
water pricing in Cyprus follows an increasing block structure. In general, increasing
block (progressive) tariﬀs are becoming more common in developed as well as devel-
oping economies. The rational for the popularity of this pricing system relates to the
perception that it can be used as a tool for social justice and conservation of a scarce
natural resource. Strictly speaking, there are no obvious eﬃciency arguments for an
increasing block water tariﬀ structure and the evidence in favour of the argument that
this pricing structure has a psychologicaleﬀect helping water demand management is
ambiguous: OECD (1987) reports evidence in favour of this argument in Japan, Italy,
Denmark and Switzerland (Zurich) while other studies (e.g. the UK metering trials in
the Thames and Yorkshire water authorities) prove inconclusive.
Consumer theory provides a useful and convenient framework for residential water
demand analysis and for the investigation of the eﬃciency and distributional eﬀects of
alternative water pricing systems. It is, therefore, not surprising that so many inves-
tigators use consumer demand analysis tools to estimate the eﬀects of price on water
demand, most mostly in the United States (Billings 1982, Schefter and David 1985,
Chicoine and Ramamurthy 1986, Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989, and Renwick and
Archibald 1998, among others). Studies that use European data include Hanke and de
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Maré (1982), Hansen (1996), Höglund (1999), Nauges and Thomas (2000) and Martinez-
Espieneira (2000). A summary of the &ndings of some of these studies is provided by
Herrington (1987). Overall the existing empirical results suggest that the price elasticity
of demand for water is signi&cantly diﬀerent from zero and lie somewhere under -0.3.
Earlier studies of water demand ignore the peculiar features of alternative water
pricing policies, such as the presence of block rates, and perform empirical estimation
using ex post-calculated average prices (Gottlieb 1963; Young 1973; Foster and Beattie
1979, 1981a, 1981b). Taylor (1975), studying electricity demand, suggests that under
a block pricing scheme the explanatory variables should include marginal and average
price. Subsequently, Nordin (1976) demonstrated that Taylors speci&cation should be
modi&ed to include a diﬀerencevariable represents the income eﬀect imposed by the
tariﬀ structure by accounting for the eﬀects of &xed and intra-marginal rates. In the case
of multiple tariﬀs (and those cases where &xed quota and/or a free allowance is used) the
diﬀerence variable is the diﬀerence between the total bill and what the user would have
paid if all units were charged at the marginal price. More recently, investigators combine
marginal price and Nordins diﬀerence variable in empirical models of residential water
demand.1
In this paper we follow a diﬀerent approach to modelling residential demand for
water. The novelty of our approach is mainly in terms of exploiting the cost and
indirect utility functions underlying the consumer theory framework to derive a most
general (rank-3) integrable demand model (Lewbel 1991). This enable us to obtain
empirical results that conform to the fundamentals of consumer theory (such as adding-
up, price homogeneity and symmetry) and have meaningful behavioural and welfare
interpretation. We consider the ability to evaluate the welfare implications of alternative
water pricing policies particularly important, given the signi&cance attached to equity
and the strong political objections to water price reform based on political economy
arguments (Dinar 2000). In the empirical analysis we treat the measurement error
problem arising from the increasing block pricing structure by using an instrumental
1Estimating water demand under a block pricing structure requires an appropriate modelling to
account for the choice of both within and between block consumption. Hewitt and Hanemann (1995),
Corral et al. (1998) and Pint (1999), apply a two-stage model in which the choice of the block is
modelled &rstly in a discrete-choice fashion (using Probit analysis) and then the quantity within that
block is chosen in a continuous way. The latter choice is modelled using simple regression analysis where
an additional variable (the so called Mills ratio) is used as additional explanatory variable to account
for the &rst stage (block) choice..
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variables (IV) estimation method. Moreover, unlike most other studies, here we use
individual household data and this allows us to study the behavioural and welfare eﬀects
of alternative pricing policy on households grouped by income and other interesting
policy characteristics. The empirical analysis in the paper focuses on the comparison
between the eﬀects of the increasing block and the uniform pricing systems on household
demand and welfare. The former is the prevailing structure of water pricing in Cyprus
and the latter is the pricing structure generally considered to be most eﬃcient on the
basis of the standard marginal cost pricing criterion.
In the next section we describe the current water tariﬀ structure applied to domestic
users and examine its regional and income distribution aspects. In the same section we
also compare the existing water tariﬀ structure with a hypothetical situation where all
water authorities in the island adopt a uniform &xed price policy. All calculations in
this section are based on the assumption that water demand for domestic use does not
respond to change in prices. This assumption is relaxed in the subsequent two sections
where &rst an integrable demand for water model is derived (Section 3) and then applied
to individual household data for the estimation of income and price elasticities and for
the calculation of the welfare of a switch to a uniform &xed price policy (Section 4).
The main conclusions of the paper are summarised in Section 5.
2 The structure and distribution of water tariﬀs in Cyprus
The government controlled part of Cyprus is divided into 37 water authorities each
having its own tariﬀ structure, as shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. The adoption of
an increasing block tariﬀ structure and diﬀerences in the application of this pricing policy
across water authorities give rise to a substantial water price heterogeneity in the island.
The eﬀects of diﬀerences in water tariﬀs on households are examined in this paper using
information on water consumption contained in the Family Expenditure Survey (FES)
1996/97. For each of over 2700 households randomly sampled, the FES reports its annual
water bill together with its expenditure on a large number of other items, the level and
sources of its income and many other characteristics such as demographic composition,
economic/employment position of its members, housing variables, ownership of durable
goods etc.
4
Using the FES 1996/97 standard geographical code we were able to allocate house-
holds to water authorities areas and calculate the level of annual water consumption
for each household and the average price paid per cubic meter (pcm) of water.2 As
shown in Diagram 1, there is substantial variation in the average price paid pcm of
water for domestic consumption in Cyprus. At the extreme bottom and top ends of the
distribution there is a small number of households paying 10 cents and over one Cyprus
pound pcm of water, respectively. Most households pay between 20 and 90 cents per
cubic meter for their water consumption.3
Diagram 1: Distribution of the average water price
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2The average price of water pcm for each household is de&ned as the water charges paid divided by
the cubic meters of water consumed over one year. The water bill of the hth houshold is WBillh =
fixed+p1q1+p2q2+...+pIqI where h = 1, ...,H denotes households and i = 1, ..., I tariﬀs. The quantity
purchased and the marginal price paid by each household in the &rst tariﬀ-block was calculated using
the formula
wb1 = fixed+ p1(10)
q1 = (WBill − fixed)/p1
MPh = p1 if WBillh > fixed and WBillh < wb1
and for the subsequent tariﬀ-blocks,
wbi = wbi−1 + pi(5)
qi = (WBill − wbi)/pi
MPh = pi if WBill ≤ wbi and WBill > wbi−1
i = 1, ..., 23
The marginal price is the charge made for the last cubic meter of water used.
3One Cyprus pound is currenly around 1.5 US dollars.
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We have also used the FES 1996/97 data to calculate the marginal price pcm of
water for each household, an important piece of information as it shows how households
would be aﬀected by a water price reform. Given the increasing block tariﬀ structure,
the marginal price pcm of water is higher than the average one in all water authorities.
As seen in Diagram 2, the frequency distribution of the marginal price pcm of water is
skewed to the left, indicating that moving up the price scale the proportion of households
paying the corresponding price for an additional cubic meter of water increases.
Diagram 2: Distribution of the marginal water price (cents)
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According to the Water Development Department (WDD), the average cost of sup-
plying one cubic meter of water for domestic consumption (including distribution costs)
is currently around 70 cents in Cyprus. Looking at the above frequency distributions,
one can conclude that over 20% of the households are paying above average cost for their
domestic water consumption. Furthermore, as seen from Diagram 2, more households
are burdened rather than subsidised. at the margin of their water consumption.
2.1 Price heterogeneity between regions
Table 1 shows how the level of consumption and prices vary across water authorities.
Under the heading Consumptionis the average amount in cubic meters purchased by
the households in the corresponding water authority and under the heading Price pcm
are the average and marginal prices paid pcm of water purchased.
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Table 1: Consumption and price pcm of water by region (in cents)
Price (cents pcm)
Water Authority Area Consumption
Average Marginal
Greater Urban SE of Pafos 170 26 33
Episkopi 167 20 38
Agios Theodoros 156 69 90
Alethriko 155 54 65
Pyla 145 54 59
Greater Urban E of Lemesos 140 20 45
Lemesos Town 140 24 40
Larnaka Greater Urban 136 60 93
Klirou 132 43 55
Kornos 119 50 70
Athienou 119 56 94
Kellaki 116 63 100
Katokopia 115 61 96
Greater Urban W of Lemesos 110 22 33
Paralimni 109 63 88
Nisou 101 56 92
Lefkosia Town 99 74 106
Lefkosia Suburbs 99 74 107
Lefkosia Greater Urban 98 70 105
Akrotiri 98 55 100
Solea 97 35 89
Pafos Town 97 40 80
Marathasa 92 20 42
Kiti 91 61 80
Larnaka Town 90 57 86
Pachna 90 46 88
Greater Urban N of Pafos 82 46 100
Parekklisia 82 45 98
Pegeia 80 38 100
Kokkinotrimithia 77 51 72
Paramytha 70 41 100
Gioulou 65 54 100
Omodos 62 26 100
Pano Panayia 56 62 100
Agros 56 22 78
Troodos 51 22 38
Salamiou 39 38 50
In relation to consumption, a notable feature of the &gures in Table 1 are the sub-
stantial regional diﬀerences in the annual amount of water purchased by households
ranging from 170 cubic meters per household in the Greater Urban Area South-East of
Paphos down to 39 cubic meters per household in the Salamiou water authority area.
To some extend these diﬀerences re! ect regional diﬀerences in life-style, for example
household living in high altitude areas can rely more on rainfall and have access to
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more and better quality groundwater resources for their domestic needs. Therefore,
their water consumption may not be as low as suggested by the &gures in Table 1.
Regarding diﬀerences in average and marginal price, the range of variation shown
in Table 1 is striking considering the size of (the non-occupied part of) Cyprus. Some
households purchase water from their local authority at an average price of 20 cents
pcm (e.g. Episkopi and Greater Urban Area East of Lemesos) whereas in other water
authority areas pay an average price of 74 cents pcm of water (Nicosia Town and its
suburbs). Even more striking are diﬀerences in the price paid by households for the last
cubic meter of water purchased from their local water authority area: from 33 cents in
Greater Urban Area South-East of Paphos and Greater Urban Area West of Lemesos
going up to over 105 cents in Nicosia Town and its suburbs.
As said earlier in this section, the observed regional diﬀerences in the price of water
can be due to diﬀerences in the water pricing policies followed by the various water
authorities, and the application of an increasing block tariﬀ system resulting in large
water users paying a higher average price than small water users. Looking at the &gures
reported in Table 1, it appears that regional diﬀerences in water pricing policies is more
likely to the cause of the observed price diﬀerences. For instance, households is Lemesos
and its suburbs consume, on average, between 40% and 70% more water per annum yet,
on average, they pay around 60% less pcm of water than households in Nicosia Town
and its suburbs.
To consider the implications of the regional heterogeneity in water prices we have
calculated the extent to which water consumption is subsidised. (or burdened) by the
current water pricing system.4 More speci&cally, we have compared the amount paid by
each household under the present water tariﬀ system with the amount which the same
household would pay for the same water consumption under a system of uniform price
where all households in all water authorities were charged 70 cents pcm of water, i.e.
the amount corresponding to the average cost of supplying one cubic meter of water for
domestic consumption. The results of this calculation are given in Table 2.
4The subsidy (or burden) associated with water consumption is calculated for each household as the
diﬀerence between the average supply cost pcm of water (estimated by the WDD to be 70 pence pcm
of water) times the quantity of water consumed, minus the water bill paid. The average subsidy is
the total subsidy divided by the cubic meters of water consumed by the household; and the marginal
subsidy the diﬀerence between the estimated average supply cost pcm of water and the marginal price
paid pcm of water by the household.
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Table 2: Subsidies by region and consumption level (cents)5
All consumers Bottom 20% Top 20%
Water Authority Area
Average Marginal Average Marginal Average Marginal
Lefkosia Suburbs -4 -37 14 -25 -20 -40
Lefkosia Town -4 -36 14 -22 -20 -40
Lefkosia Greater Urban -3 -35 16 -15 -20 -40
Agios Theodoros 0 -20 10 -20 -8 -20
Kellaki 7 -30 . . . .
Paralimni 7 -19 24 14 -11 -30
Pano Panayia 8 -30 . . . .
Katokopia 9 -26 31 -10 -12 -30
Kiti 9 -11 . . . .
Larnaka Greater Urban 9 -23 28 6 -10 -30
Larnaka Town 12 -16 27 -2 -2 -20
Athienou 13 -24 . . . .
Nisou 14 -23 32 5 -4 -30
Akrotiri 15 -30 . . . .
Gioulou 16 -30 . . . .
Pyla 16 11 21 16 12 1
Alethriko 16 4 . . . .
Kokkinotrimithia 19 -2 33 28 -4 -30
Kornos 20 5 31 13 1 -10
Greater Urban N of Pafos 24 -30 31 -30 11 -30
Pachna 24 -18 . . . .
Parekklisia 24 -29 38 -24 1 -30
Klirou 27 15 38 30 18 10
Paramytha 29 -30 . . . .
Pafos Town 30 -11 42 10 13 -20
Pegeia 31 -30 37 -30 26 -30
Salamiou 32 20 . . . .
Solea 35 -19 49 22 11 -30
Omodos 44 -30 . . . .
Greater Urban SE of Pafos 44 37 46 40 41 28
Lemesos Town 46 30 46 56 38 10
Greater Urban W of Lemesos 47 36 50 57 39 20
Troodos 48 32 . . . .
Marathasa 48 28 . . . .
Agros 48 -8 . . . .
Greater Urban E of Lemesos 49 24 58 47 38 10
Episkopi 50 31 58 50 32 10
Looking at the &rst column, under the heading All consumers, we can see that, on
the basis of the average price paid pcm of water, only households in the Lefkosia and
its suburbs have annual water bills above what they would have had under the uniform
(70 cents pcm of water) pricing policy. Furthermore, even in these few water authority
where households would bene&t from a move to uniform water pricing, the gain is very
small, around 4 cents pcm of water. In contrast, households in all other water authority
5A dot indicates that the number of obsrvations in the corresponding cell were less than 5 and no
average was computed.
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areas would be worse oﬀ under the uniform pricing system, especially those living in
water authority areas where the average price pcm of water is very low, e.g. the Lemesos
and its suburbs and some Troodos mountain areas.
The picture, however, is completely diﬀerent when we look at the marginal bene&t
to households from switching to the uniform price policy. In this case under the uniform
water pricing system households in most water authority areas would pay less for an
extra cubic meter of water than the amount they pay under the current system. In
some areas the gain derived from switching to the uniform price system is very high,
35-37 pcm of water for households living in Lefkosia and its suburbs. At the same time,
however, even at high levels of water consumption, households living in Lemesos and its
suburbs would loose from switching from the current to the uniform price system. This
is seen more clearly in the columns under the heading Bottom 20%and Top 20%,
showing the change in subsidy (or burden) which would result from switching from the
current to a uniform price system for the 20% of households with the lowest and highest
water consumption, respectively.
Assuming that the uniform price system considered here represents the true cost of
supplying a cubic meter of water to households, the results above suggest that under
the present water tariﬀ system in Cyprus domestic water consumption in some water
authorities (Lemesos and its suburbs in particular) is heavily subsidised. even in the
case of the very large water users. In contrast, large users in other areas (especially in
Nicosia and its suburbs) are heavily burdened by the current pricing system.
2.2 Price heterogeneity between income groups
The observed regional heterogeneity in the water price structure in Cyprus is primarily
due to historical reasons, most probably the fact that areas blessed with more water
resources resist economic and social arguments for a more equitable sharing of these
resources. The increasing block tariﬀ system, however, is based on both eﬃciency
and equity considerations. The eﬃciency aspect relates to the negative externality of
depleting a scarce natural resource, hence a system where the price of water increases
with consumption can be seen as a measure to reduce this externality. The equity aspect
relates to the fact that water is an essential item, therefore every household should be
able to consume a subsistence amount of it. Indeed, one may also argue that since a
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minimum amount of water consumption is required for hygienic purposes, subsidising
water up to a certain level can be justi&ed on eﬃciency grounds too.
Table 3 shows the average annual consumption (cubic meters) and the average and
marginal price paid pcm of water by households in diﬀerent income groups. Water is
a normal good, i.e. its level of consumption increases with income (second column in
Table 3) and a necessity, i.e. its share in income decreases with income (third column
in Table 3).6 The average price pcm of water increases as we move from lower to
higher income groups, indicating that the current water pricing structure in Cyprus is
progressive. For example, households in the lowest 10% of income distribution pay 42
cents whereas those at the top 10% of income distribution pay 59 cents pcm of water.
Also progressive, albeit by a lower rate, is the marginal price pcm of water, rising from
70 cents for households in the lowest 10% of income distribution to 85 cents pcm of
water for households in the top 10% of income distribution.
Table 3: Consumption level and prices by income group
Income
group
Consumption
(Pounds)
Share in
income
Average
price (cents)
Marginal
price (cents)
0%-10% 81 1.6% 42 70
11%-25% 95 0.9% 47 76
26%-50% 110 0.6% 50 79
51%-75% 116 0.4% 54 82
76%-90% 123 0.3% 54 83
Top 10% 130 0.2% 59 85
It follows from the points above that making the same assumption about water tariﬀ
reform as in the previous subsection (i.e. switching from the regionally heterogeneous
increasing block pricing system to a homogeneous one where everyone pays a ! at rate
of 70 cents pcm of water) will not be advantageous to the low income households. The
eﬀects of this water price reform on households grouped by income are shown in Diagram
3.
6 It is worth noting here that the decline in the share of water in consumer expenditure decreases
at high income levels. This phenomenon is behind the increasing with income elasticity of demand for
water which we as &nd in the empirical analysis in Section 4.
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On average, households in all income groups would end up paying more for their
current water consumption if the existing increasing block pricing system is replaced by a
uniform pricing system. Again, assuming that the uniform price system considered here
represents the true cost of supplying a cubic meter of water to households, this means
that the water consumption of all income groups is subsidised. The largest subsidy (28
cents pcm of water) is enjoyed by households in the lowest 10% and the smallest (11
cents) by the top 10% of income distribution.
The picture, again, is very diﬀerent in the case of the marginal bene&ts from switch-
ing to a uniform pricing system: all income groups would pay either the same (lowest
income group) or less (all other income groups) for an additional cubic meter of water
consumption under the uniform price system compared to the existing system. This
means that marginal water consumption is not subsidised for any income group under
the existing water tariﬀ system. Those at the lowest 10% of income distribution, on
average, purchase their last cubic meter of water at supply cost (70 cents pcm). As we
move up the income scale households pay more for their marginal water consumption,
with those in the top 10% of income distribution paying 15 cents pcm of water above
the supply cost.
Diagram 3: Average and marginal subsidy by income group
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The tables and diagrams above compare the current consumption and increasing
block tariﬀ system with the hypothetical uniform pricing system on the assumption
that water demand for domestic use is the same under the two price regimes. This
assumption however is not realistic because household demand for water is likely to
change in opposite direction to the change in price. The extent to which this will happen
is determined by the price elasticity. In the next section we consider consumer demand
for water in the context of a theoretical model satisfying the fundamental principles of
consumer theory. This enables us to not only estimate the price elasticity of demand
for water in a theoretically consistent manner but also integratethis demand back to
the underlying cost and (indirect) utility functions to evaluate the welfare implications
of the two price regimes.
3 Modelling tariﬀ eﬀects on consumer demand and welfare
We assume that preferences over goods are separable from leisure and public goods
and can be expressed in terms of the Quadratic Logarithmic cost function (Lewbel 1990)
lnC (p, uh) = a (p) +
b (p)uh
1− g (p)uh , (1)
where uh is the utility of the hth household (consumer) and p the vector of market
prices of goods (p1, p2, ...., pI). Also a (p) , b (p) and g (p) are linearly independent and
homogeneous functions the parameters of which can be allowed to vary with observable
household characteristics (family size and composition, the education and occupation of
household members etc) as shown in the empirical analysis described the next section.
The three price indices in (1) are assumed to have the Quadratic Almost Ideal
Demand System (QUAIDS) form proposed by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997),
a (p) = ao +Σiailnpi + .5ΣiΣjγijlnpjlnpi,
b (p) = Πip
βi
i , (2)
g (p) = Σiλilnpi,
yielding Marshallian demands in budget shares form,
wih = ai +Σjγijlnpj + βi [lnyh − a (p)] +
λi
Πip
βi
i
[lnyh − a (p)]2 , (3)
13
where yh is the budget of the hth household.7 The parameters obey the restrictions:
Σiai = 1, Σiβi = Σiλi = 0 and Σiγij = 0 for adding-up; Σjγij = 0 for homogeneity; and
γij = γji for symmetry.
Here we concentrate on consumer demand for a single commodity, water for domestic
use, and assume that all other goods can be grouped in a Hicksian composite good.
Therefore, the ith subscript is dropped for convenience so that the QUAIDS budget
share of water is written,
whr = a+ γln(p/P ) + βlnYh +
λ
P (p/P )β
(lnYh)
2 , (4)
where P is the price (index) summarising the cost of all the goods other than water and
lnYh = lnyh − ao − .5γln(p/P )2 − lnP − aln(p/P ).
We de&ne the market price of water as pr = p∗sr where p∗ is the producers price, the
subscript r = 1, ..., R denotes the water tariﬀ area and sr = (1+ tr), where −1 < tr < 0
is the tax paid and 0 < tr < 1 the subsidy received by consumers in the rth tariﬀ area
as proportion of the producers price. When the latter and the prices of all goods other
than water for domestic consumption are &xed we may normalise to pr = sr and P = 1
so that the (4) becomes
whr = a+ γlnsr + β
h
lnxhr − alnsr − .5γ (lns)2r
i
+
λ
sβr
h
lnxh − alnsr − .5γ (lnsr)2
i2
, (5)
where lnxh is consumer expenditure measured from some minimum ao.8 The variable
sr in (5) is a price index re! ecting the tax paid (if sr > 1) or subsidy received (if sr < 1)
by the consumer.
Knowledge of the parameters in (5) enable one to consider the implications of al-
ternative water pricing policies on consumer behaviour and welfare. The behavioural
7The QUAIDS demand system belongs to the family of Rank-3 demand systems, the most general
empirical representation of consumer preferences that satis&es integrability (Gorman 1980 and Lewbell
1991). In the context of our analysis integrability is vital for considering the welfare implications of
alternative water pricing policies.
8The parameter ao is diﬃcult to identify in empirical application and is set at a value corresponding
to the minimum log expenditure in the sample. In the empirical analysis below we take this to be
the average log expenditure of the households in our sample which are in the lowest percentile of the
expenditure distribution.
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eﬀects can be summarised by the budget elasticity
1
whr
µ
β +
2λ
sβr
h
lnxh − alnsr − .5γ (lns)2hr
i¶
+ 1 (6)
and the (compensated) elasticity with respect to sr
1
whr

γ − β (a− γlns) + 2λ
sr
(a− γlns)
h
lnxh − alnsr − .5γ (lns)2hr
i
− λ
sβ+1r
h
lnxh − alnsr − .5γ (lns)2hr
i2
− 1 (7)
of consumer demand for water. Evaluated at sr = 1 the budget and tax (or subsidy)
elasticity formulas simplify to
(1/whr) (β + 2λlnxh) + 1 (8)
and (1/whr) [γ − βa− (2λa+ λβ) lnxh]− 1, (9)
respectively. The parameters estimates required for the evaluation of these elasticities
are obtained from &tting the water demand equation (5) to the data.
The eﬀects of alternative water pricing policies on consumer welfare can be evalu-
ated using the indirect utility function corresponding to the quadratic logarithmic cost
function (1)
V (xh,p) =
lnxh − a (p)
g (p) [lnxh − a (p)] + b (p) . (10)
For the hth household to obtain the same utility level under the reference price vector
p∗ and some other price regime p, the following equality must hold,
lnxh − a (p)
g (p) [lnxh − a (p)] + b (p) =
lnx∗h − a (p∗)
g (p∗)
£
lnx∗h − a (p∗)
¤
+ b (p∗)
, (11)
where lnx∗h is the household expenditure under the reference price regime. At p
∗ = 1
(11) can be written as the log expenditure index
lnXh ≡ ln
µ
xh
x∗h
¶
= a (p) +
[b (p)− 1] lnx∗h
1− lnx∗hg (p)
, (12)
showing the change in log expenditure required by the household facing prices p to
obtain the same level of utility as at reference prices p∗. Assuming p are the increasing
block tariﬀ and p∗ the uniform price system, lnXh can be interpreted as the consumers
willingness to pay a proportion of her/his income to avoid (or the compensation required
to accept) the former in place of the latter pricing system.
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Given the functional form of the QUAIDS demand system and the assumption that
goods other than water can be grouped as one composite item, at p∗i = 1 all i, (12)
becomes
lnXhr = (a+ .5γlnsr)lnsr +
³
sβr − 1
´
lnx∗h
1− lnx∗hλlnsr
(13)
and, like the budget and tax (or subsidy) elasticity, can be computed for each household
in the sample using the parameter estimates obtained from &tting the water demand
equation (5) to the data as described in the next section. The only diﬃculty here is that
the expenditure index depends on lnx∗h, a well known problem in the consumer welfare
literature arising from the dependence of the expenditure index on the base utility level.
In the empirical analysis below we compute the expenditure index at x∗h = 1. This is
equivalent to evaluating the cost of the price change at subsistence utility level, in which
case whr = a+ γlnsr and (5) can be written as
lnXhr = (whr − .5γlnsr)lnsr. (14)
Furthermore we compute the deadweight lossindex associated with a change in
the price regime. We de&ned this index as the change in (indirect) log utility caused by
a change in price regime with total expenditure remaining at its base period level,
lnWh =
ln [x∗h (p)]− a (p)
g (p)
£
lnx∗h (p)− a (p)
¤
+ b (p)
− lnx
∗
h − a (p∗)
g (p∗)
£
lnx∗h − a (p∗)
¤
+ b (p∗)
, (15)
where, using qih to denote quantities,
ln [x∗h(p)] = ln(Σiq
∗
ihpi) = ln [x
∗
hΣiw
∗
ih(pi/p
∗
i )] ' lnx∗h +Σiw∗ihln(pi/p∗i )
is the expenditure in the base period spent under the current price regime.
Normalising at x∗h = 1 and p
∗
i = 1 all i, and using the same assumptions as before
(i.e. the functional form of the QUAIDS demand system with goods other than water
grouped as one composite item),
lnWh =
w∗hrlnsr − (a+ .5γlnsr)lnsr
λlnsr
£
w∗hrlnsr − (a+ .5γlnsr)lnsr
¤
+ sβr
=
−.5γ (lnsr)2
−.5γλ (lnsr)3 + sβr
(16)
This eﬀectively re! ects the substitution eﬀect caused by changes in relative prices, as
de&ned by −.5γ (lnsr)2 in (16); the denominator simply adjusts this eﬀect to account
for the non-homotheticity of preferences and should not deviate from unity.
16
4 Empirical analysis
The analysis in the previous section ignores two fundamental issues pertaining to
empirical application based on individual household data: (i) demand for water is af-
fected not just by the consumers budget and prices but also by many demographic,
housing and other characteristics and (ii) under increasing block pricing the subsidy (or
burden) depends on the amount of water used by the individual household.
We take account of household heterogeneity by allowing the intercept in the demand
for water equation (5) to depend on a large number of characteristics drawn from the
FES 1996/97 and found to aﬀect consumer behaviour in other consumer demand studies
based on individual household data (e.g. Blundell, Pashardes and Weber 1993). These
household characteristics are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix.
The dependence of tax/subsidy on the amount of water used is accounted for by
replacing sr in (5), calculated on the basis of the actual quantity of water used (as
explained in Section 2) with bshr, its value corresponding to the predicted quantity of
water used. The latter is obtained from the reduced form equation,
qhr = εo +ΣmεmZmhr + vhr (17)
where Zmhr is the mth exogenous variable corresponding to the hth household in the
rth region and vhr a random error. Among the Z, s are all the household characteristics
and other variables included in the demand for water equation below (except sr) plus
dummies for the water tariﬀ area, capturing diﬀerences in unit cost and other diﬀerences
in water consumption between water tariﬀ areas in the island. The full list of variables
included in (17) is reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. The same table also reports
the parameter estimates and diagnostic statistics obtained from &tting (17) to data.
Incorporating in (5) the modi&cations required to account for household heterogene-
ity and increasing block pricing (i.e. the endogeneity of sr) we obtain
whr = a+Σkδklnzkh + β
h
lnxh − (a+Σkδklnzkh) lnbshr − .5γ (lnbs)2hri (18)
+γlnbshr + λbsβhr
h
lnxh − (a+Σkδklnzkh) lnbshr − .5γ (lnbs)2hri2 + uhr,
where zkh is the kth characteristic of the hth household and uhr a random error. The
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dependent variable is de&ned as the share of water in household expenditure on non-
durable goods.
The parameters in (18), estimated by Maximum Likelihood, are reported together
with their standard errors (and some system diagnostic statistics) in Table A2 in the
Appendix. The price and budget (income) elasticities corresponding to these parameter
estimates have been calculated for each household in the sample using the formulas (8)
and (9) in Section 3. The elasticities, grouped by household income, are shown in Table
4.
As one would expect, water appears to be a necessity, with a budget elasticity ranging
between 0.25 for the lowest income group to 0.48 for the highest income group. The
increasing budget elasticity with income, suggesting that water is more of a necessity
to households with lower rather than higher income, is a puzzle to us. A possible
explanation of this phenomenon can be the fact that water is a complement to large
houses with lawned gardens, swimming pools, jacuzzis and other luxury goods purchased
by the rich.9 Another possible explanation for the increase in budget elasticity with
income is the fact that under the current increasing block tariﬀ system rich people tend
to be large water users and pay more for a given quantity of water. Therefore a given
proportional change in their demand means more to them in terms of income than the
same proportional change in the consumption of low income households. The average
budget elasticity of demand for water for the population as a whole is 0.32.
Table 4: Price and budget elasticities by income group
Income group
Elasticity 0%-
10%
11%-
25%
26%-
50%
51%-
75%
75%-
90%
Top
10%
Budget 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.35 0.48
Price -0.79 -0.69 -0.60 -0.56 -0.50 -0.39
9As seen in Table A2 in the Appendix, although we conditon demand for water on certain durable
goods (washing machines, dishwashers etc) and household characteristics, we have not been able to do
this for all such goods and characteristics aﬀecting water consumption due to lack of information. One
particularly important conditioning variable missing from our empirical water demand equation, for the
same reason, is access to groundater.
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The price elasticity of demand for water declines with income: it starts from -0.79
for the worse oﬀ and decreases (in absolute size) to -0.39 for the better oﬀ households.
This means that low income households are more sensitive to changes in the price of
water than high income households. One possible reason for this result is that, as said
earlier, high income households tend to consume water in conjunction with expensive
durables goods; therefore, their demand is less responsive to water price changes.
One could point to the decline in the price elasticity of demand for water as income
increases, as evidence against the argument in favour of using price as a water demand
management tool. At the same time, however, the same argument is strengthened by
the empirical evidence here, in the sense that the price elasticities of demand for water
reported in Table 4 are probably among the highest ever estimated.
Turning to the welfare eﬀects we calculate the expenditure index (14) and the dead-
weight loss index (16) by region and income group, by comparing the present water
price system with the uniform price one. Furthermore, we express the results in Cyprus
pounds per annum (in 1997 prices) to show (i) in the case of the expenditure index the
amount the various household groups are willing to pay (be paid) to accept a switch
from the current to the uniform price system and (ii) in the case of the deadweight loss
index the loss in pounds due the price distortion created by the regional variation and
the increasing block tariﬀ system.
The results of these calculations are shown in Diagrams 4 and 5. Commending &rst
on the results by region (Diagram 4)10, as one would expect from the analysis in Section
2, those willing to pay the highest amount, households living in the Greater Urban area
SE of Pafos, Lemesos and its suburbs are the most willing to pay (up to 47 Cyprus
pounds) to avoid a change from the current to the uniform pricing system. Notably,
the Greater Urban area SE of Pafos fares badly here due to the large price subsidies
maintained at high levels of water consumption in this water authority area. In contrast
households in Nicosia and its suburbs and in Larnaca are the most willing to pay (up
to 33 Cyprus pounds) for the replacement of the current increasing bloc tariﬀ with a
uniform water pricing system.
10 In Diagram 4 we show only regions where the water price reform causes a change in water above
ten Cyprus pounds per annum.
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Diagram 4: Welfare eﬀects by region (in Cyprus pounds p.a.)
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Expenditure effects Deadweight loss
Turning to the deadweight loss, again, this is most pronounced (up to 8 Cyprus
pounds or more per annum) in areas with large price distortions among large water
users: Greater Urban area SE of Pafos, Lemesos and its suburbs. In interpreting the
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deadweight loss here one can say that it re! ects the amount households would be able
to forgo if hey were able to replace the water subsidy with a cash payment. It therefore
shows the wasteassociated with the current pricing system.
Diagram 5: Welfare eﬀects by income (in Cyprus pounds p.a.)
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The welfare eﬀects by income in Diagram 5 show that all household groups, on
average, would be willing to pay to move to the uniform water pricing system except
those in the lowest income group which would pay to avoid such a move. Furthermore,
given the inherent progressivity of the current increasing block pricing system, the
amount households would be willing to pay for a change from the current to the uniform
pricing system increases with income, up to 16 Cyprus pounds p.a for those in the top
10% of income distribution. Again, there is a deadweight loss associated with the current
pricing system measured by the amount households would be willing to forgo as bene&t
received through water subsidies if they had the option to replace this bene&t with cash.
The deadweight loss also increases with income but very slightly so, indicating that the
price distortions are not highly correlated with household income.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the eﬀects of switching from the current regionally het-
erogeneous increasing block water pricing system to a regionally homogeneous uniform
pricing one. We &nd that the current system is progressive but ineﬃcient in the sense
that it introduces gross price distortions resulting in deadweight loss. The regional
diﬀerences, in particular, introduce a substantial price heterogeneity that cannot be
justi&ed on the basis of eﬃciency or equity criteria. It cannot be justi&ed on eﬃciency
grounds because it is diﬃcult to imagine that in a small island like Cyprus such large
regional diﬀerences in price can re! ect diﬀerences in supply costs. The regional price
heterogeneity cannot also be justi&ed on equity grounds because we found that users
of large quantities of water pay substantially less per cubic meter of water than users
consuming much smaller amounts of water.
Our empirical analysis suggests that the price elasticity of demand for water ranges
between -.4 for households in the lowest and -.8 for households in the highest 10% of
income distribution. This means that, in the case of residential water use, price can play
a role in the context of a demand management scheme designed to tackle the growing
fresh water problems in Cyprus. Such an approach, however, should take into account
the distributional impact of alternative price regimes. Any major water price reform is
bound to have eﬀects on the welfare of individual consumers. In other words there will
be winners and losers, and therefore there will also be a need to consider how to deal
with potential hardship caused by the water price reform.
We believe that inevitably there will be a move towards a more uniform marginal cost
pricing system in Cyprus. Our empirical results show that such a system is desirable
in terms of reducing the deadweight loss associated with the price distortions of the
present system. At the same time, however, its bene&ts will be distributed in favour
of the better oﬀ households, while households in the bottom 10% of the distribution
of income will be net losers. Furthermore, we believe that for a water pricing policy
to be capable of ensuring sustainable development of water resources, must go beyond
the purely quantitative aspect of water demand to also take into account qualitative
considerations. This is an important area in need of more research in the water demand
management literature.
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